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OUR MANDATE
The University of Calgary is home to scholars in 16 faculties (offering more than 80 academic programs) and 36 Research
Institutes and Centres including The School of Public Policy. Under the direction of Jack Mintz, Palmer Chair in Public Policy, and
supported by more than 100 academics and researchers, the work of The School of Public Policy and its students
contributes to a more meaningful and informed public debate on fiscal, social, energy, environmental and international
issues to improve Canada’s and Alberta’s economic and social performance.
The School of Public Policy achieves its objectives through fostering ongoing partnerships with federal, provincial, state and
municipal governments, industry associations, NGOs, and leading academic institutions internationally. Foreign Investment
Advisory Committee of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Finance Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada, and Government of Alberta, are just some of the partners already engaged with the School’s
activities. 
For those in government, The School of Public Policy helps to build capacity and assists in the training of public servants
through degree and non-degree programs that are critical for an effective public service in Canada. For those outside of the
public sector, its programs enhance the effectiveness of public policy, providing a better understanding of the objectives and
limitations faced by governments in the application of legislation.
1. INTRODUCTION
The G-20 was created to deal with the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. G-20
leaders were successful – the crisis was contained. Should the G-20 leaders move on to deal
with the most difficult and hitherto intractable global environmental policy issues? The United
Nations has not been up to the task; can the G-20 fill the vacuum? 
This paper reviews the criteria for issues to be included on the G-20 leaders’ agenda and
provides a tour d’horizon appraising the state of the global environment. It also includes some
“Global Footprint” statistics demonstrating the current global unsustainable rates of
consumption. Based on the G-20 agenda criteria, of ten global environmental issues, only
climate change qualifies for consideration. Annex I canvasses the status of nine other specific
dimensions of the global environment – Water, Forests, Biodiversity and Land Use
Management, Air Pollution, Waste Management, Ozone Layer Depletion, Oceans, Fisheries
and Population. The paper describes the inadequacy and fragmentation of present institutional
arrangements. 
The concluding section provides conjectures and recommendations on a pragmatic approach
for G-20 engagement with climate change and outlines a package of initiatives, with each
element arguably being in every G-20 country’s national interest. Elements of the package
include “no regrets” actions, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, standards, R&D collaboration
and security of supply arrangements. The G-20 could also help rationalize the jumbled melange
of international environmental organizations and catalyze the creation of effective governance
institutions and mechanisms. 
2. CRITERIA FOR THE G-20 AGENDA
The G-20 first referred to the Finance Ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States of America. The European Union, which is represented by the Presidents
of the European Council and the European Commission, is the 20th member of the G-20. 
The first G-20 at leaders’ level was called by former US president George W. Bush in the fall
of 2008 to deal with the global financial crisis. G-20 summits, bringing together heads of
governments, have taken place in London and Pittsburgh in 2009 and Toronto and Seoul in
2010. There were 33 seats at the table in Seoul in November 2010 as Korea issued invitations
to four countries as heads of regional groups: Ethiopia (NEPAD), Malawi (African Union),
Singapore (3G), and Vietnam (ASEAN). The Koreans also invited Spain and the heads of
seven international organizations – the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB). The next meeting will be in November 2011 under France’s presidency. In 2012,
the G-20 will be hosted by Mexico. In 2013, either Turkey or Russia will preside. Australia is
campaigning for the 2014 G-20 presidency.1
1 The G-20 is following the “bucket system” set up by the G-20 Finance Ministers.  
See http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/11/future-g20-process   
Regarding Australia see http://www.theage.com.au/national/pitch-to-host-g20-summit-in-2014-20110316-1bxbv.html 
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Proponents of the G-20 argue that the need for global leadership and coherence can only be
provided by some sort of flexible leaders’ council2. A forum at the leaders' level is the most
likely means whereby cross-cutting package deals can be crafted, permitting leaders to strike
deals that transcend the traditional silos of government ministries and international institutions.
Leaders have the ability to mobilize their governments through top-down political direction,
ensuring that their global promises translate into national action. Leaders can rise above
domestic politics and adopt policies that provide global collective benefits while applying peer
pressure and clarifying enlightened national self-interest as they coordinate actions on
deadlocked global crises.
There are several general criteria to assess whether an issue is suitable for inclusion on the
G-20 agenda given the need to maintain concentration on a limited number of issues and not
let “agenda creep” overload the work program. There are already an excessive number of
summit meetings (UN General Assembly every September, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), NATO, Asia–EU, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Commonwealth
and the Francophonie). There is a limit to the length of summits – usually about two days.
There is also an inherited agenda of legacy issues, with a great deal of public attention on
progress made on commitments. The incentive facing the host of a G-20 summit is to minimize
the number of items on the agenda.
The criteria include:
1. Major implications for both advanced and emerging economies;
2. The G-20’s concern should be crisis management. There must be a real need for immediate
action, as well as leadership on issues with significant long term consequences. There must
be a shared sense that action cannot be postponed.
3. The G-20 should get involved in an issue only as a last resort when existing machinery
proves unequal to the task. The G-20 should avoid issues that can be effectively dealt with
by existing international organizations. 
4. The G-20 must not “waste its bullets.” It should focus on issues where there are prospects
for success. Even if the G-20 is the last resort, there must be hope for a workable solution
– a forward looking, focused suite of immediate deliveries, actions and promises that
offered a win-win-win outcome for G-20 countries
The first criterion is clear – most of the international environmental issues described in this
paper do have major implications for both advanced and emerging economies. The second
emergency criterion, the need for immediate action, is less clear. On the one hand, one can
argue that we must await a dire emergency before expecting action; on the other hand, there is
a moral imperative with respect to responsibility to future generations. The second criterion
should be that immediate action by the G-20 can slow the onset of a crisis where we anticipate
an inevitable “train wreck.” 
The last resort criterion argues that we should not undermine existing institutions currently
grappling with the issues. Countries that are not members believe the G-20 has no legitimacy
to make decisions on any issues that in effect bind the rest of the world. They argue that only
the universal membership, treaty-based UN should deal with major global issues.  
2 Summit analysts have argued that the personal relationships developed among leaders, free from scripted remarks,
allow them to build empathy and trust, permitting unrestricted discussion which results in agreements unreachable in
formal negotiations. However, the conventional wisdom of leaders meeting together for a free-wheeling discussion is
foreign to some cultures, the Chinese and Japanese in particular.
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Given the large number of issues that are candidates for the G-20 agenda, the host country has
considerable influence. By tradition, the presidency of the G-20, which rotates on an annual
basis, is given the courtesy of framing the agenda. The prospects for G-20 leadership are
problematic, given the priorities of France, the G-20 president3 in 2011. In August 2010,
French President Nicolas Sarkozy made clear his intention to add more items to the G-20
agenda – international monetary system reform, commodity markets’ volatility, and global
governance (reform of the UN Security Council).4 This is in addition to the standing items –
economic recovery, the Framework for Balanced Growth and financial sector regulation, along
with reports on development and a financial safety net, the issues introduced by Korea in
November. 
This is an already overburdened agenda, mostly unconnected to environmental issues.
Proponents of adding an international environmental issue to the future G-20 agenda therefore
face serious hurdles5. With respect to concerns about overloading the G-20 summit agenda, the
Koreans warned against allowing “heavyweight issues” like climate change to dilute the focus.6
A dispassionate analysis of the prospects for success criterion leads to the conclusion that G-20
consideration of climate change should focus on the less contentious building blocks such as a
global “Manhattan Project” on energy R&D, standards and border tax adjustments and security
of supply cooperation while postponing discussion of national emission targets or financial
transfers. Action may have to await Mexico’s presidency in 2012.
3.  THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
“Human actions are depleting Earth’s natural capital, putting such strain on the
environment that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations
can no longer be taken for granted.” – United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
3.1 Overview
It is a daunting challenge to attempt an appraisal of the global environment, given its many
complexities. It is particularly difficult to clearly communicate the results of a large number of
measures and the sensitivity of results to the many assumptions. Three of the best efforts are
the UN’s “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,” the OECD’s “Environmental Outlook to 2030”
and the Global Footprint Network (GFN).7
3 See http://www.sherpatimes.com/summits/44-g20/355-so-what-is-it-french-g20-presidency-changes-priorites-to-suit-
audience.html  But last August, Sarkozy suggested that the G-20 discuss climate funding in view of a global
agreement at the November summit, ahead of the climate change conference in Cancun in December and that Europe
and other developed nations must ''deliver on the commitments taken'' regarding aid to developing countries to fight
climate change, innovative funding methods and the protection of forests. In any case, the G-20 is not a panacea –
presidential agendas and short-term thinking significantly hinder the G-20’s effectiveness.
4 http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article5123 Security Council reform has since been dropped
5 It is also unlikely that a separate dedicated meeting would be called. In Seoul, the decision was made to have just
one G-20 leaders’ meeting a year.
6 http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/CUSKPNewsletter485x11.pdf
7 http://www.iisd.org/generata/?page_id=1262
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The United Nations’ “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment” (MA), published in 2005, is “the
first comprehensive audit of the status of Earth’s natural capital.”8 The assessment identified a
number of “emergent” findings, conclusions that can only be reached when a large body of
existing information is examined together: 
• 60 percent of a group of 24 ecosystem services (e.g., clean water, food, forest products,
flood control and natural resources) examined by the MEA are being degraded.
• The likelihood of nonlinear changes is increasing; the risks include disease emergence,
abrupt alterations in water quality, the creation of “dead zones” in coastal waters, the
collapse of fisheries and shifts in regional climate. 
• While major problems exist with tropical forests and coral reefs, the most significant
challenges involve dry land ecosystems. 
• Excessive nutrient loading of ecosystems is one of the major drivers today and will grow
significantly worse in the coming decades unless action is taken.9
The conclusion is that “with appropriate actions it is possible to reverse the degradation of
many ecosystem services over the next 50 years, but the changes in policy and practice
required are substantial and not currently underway.”10
The OECD’s “Environmental Outlook to 2030”11 confirmed the UN’s assessment. The OECD
reviewed the drivers of environmental change and focused on the challenges of climate change,
air pollution, biodiversity, freshwater and waste, and material flows. Its synthesis displayed
findings by presenting the challenges according to a traffic light system. Environmental issues
which are not well managed – defined as areas in a bad or worsening state, and which require
urgent attention – are classified as Red Lights. In addition to the well-known challenges of
climate change such as increasing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and urban air quality,
“red lights” were assigned to biodiversity, renewable natural resources, ecosystem quality,
species loss, invasive alien species, tropical forests, illegal logging, ecosystem fragmentation,
water (water scarcity, groundwater quality, and agricultural water use and pollution) and waste
and hazardous chemicals (hazardous waste management and transportation and chemicals in
the environment and in products).
The GFN methodology is sophisticated, accounting for five distinct land-use types (crops,
grazing, fishing, forests, and built-up) plus indirect demand for biocapacity in the form of
absorptive capacity for CO2 emissions and the footprints embodied in both the imports and
exports of commodity flows.12
8 http://www.maweb.org/en/About.aspx 
9 http://www.maweb.org/en/About.aspx#2 
10 http://www.maweb.org/en/About.aspx#2
11 OECD, 2008 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/33/40200582.pdf
12 Ibid.
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The GFN tracks the human demand on ecosystem services. The National Footprint Accounts
(NFA) quantify the “annual supply of and demand for ecosystem products and services.”13 The
Ecological Footprint is our demand on nature – the annual demand of populations and activities
on the earth. Biological capacity is the annual supply of the earth in the amount of biologically
productive land and sea area available to provide the ecosystem services that humanity
consumes.14 The NFA use over 5,000 data points for each country and year to “determine the
area required to produce the biological resources a country uses to absorb its wastes, and to
compare this with the area available.”15 The NFA utilize international data sets published by the
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Statistics Division and the International
Energy Agency (IEA) as well as data from peer-reviewed science journals and thematic
collections. They use this data to calculate the ecological footprint and biocapacity of more than
200 countries and territories as well as global totals.  
Ecological footprint-accounting quantifies and tracks resources consumed and waste generated.
Resource and waste flows are measured in terms of the biologically productive area necessary to
maintain flows. Flows that cannot be measured are excluded from the assessment, leading to an
underestimate of humanity’s true ecological footprint. Weighting each area in proportion to its
bioproductivity, different types of areas are converted into the common unit of global hectares,
hectares with world-average bioproductivity, which are totalled to obtain an aggregate indicator
of ecological footprint or biocapacity. The ecological footprint can be directly compared to
nature’s supply, biocapacity, both expressed in global hectares. Area demanded can exceed area
supplied if demand on an ecosystem exceeds that ecosystem’s regenerative capacity.16
FIGURE 1.  World Overshoot – 2010 Edition of the National Footprint Accounts17
13 Ewing B., A. Reed, A. Galli, J. Kitzes, and M. Wackernagel. 2010. Calculation Methodology for the National Footprint
Accounts, 2010 Edition. Oakland: Global Footprint Network.
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/uploads/National_Footprint_Accounts_Method_Paper_2010.pdf 
14 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/footprint_basics_overview/ 
15 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/methodology/
16 Ibid.
17 Source: Ewing et al, 2010. 
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3.2. Rationale for consideration by the G-20
The table below assesses climate change and the nine other global environmental issues
(discussed in Annex 1) by the criteria described in Section 2, above. 
TABLE 1.  Criteria for G-20 Agenda Items
The conclusion is that only climate change is an unambiguously serious candidate for the G-20
agenda. Biodiversity, waste management, water, fisheries18 and ocean and air pollution issues
do not appear to meet the criterion of having serious implications for both developed and
developing G-20 countries. Forests19 and ozone depletion miss the mark on the apparent need
for immediate action. While some may argue that climate change action can be delayed, albeit
requiring more aggressive action at a later date, the scientific consensus is that tipping points
will soon be reached that lead to irreversible consequences. The population issue is just too
politically contentious, so it fails the prospect for success criterion.
18 With respect to overfishing, the G-20 could design an approach to effectively implement existing commitments,
promote compliance and reduce overcapacity. The G-20 could invite the FAO, OECD, and UN Environment
Programme (UNEP) to report on inefficient fishing subsidies and policies to reduce overcapacity in fishing fleets. It
could request the WTO and the Marine Stewardship Council to report on options to improve enforcement and
promote compliance, such as “white lists” and eco-labelling. It could set up a formal G-20 working group to examine
the possibility of establishing an International Oceans Authority, responsible for Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations (RFMOs).
19 Regarding forests, the G-20 could support the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD) initiative, which could make an important contribution to combating climate change and reducing poverty.
REDD offers financial incentives to preserve tropical forests and keep them growing.
http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4123.php 
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ISSUES Universal Global Need for G-20 as Prospects
Implications/ Immediate Last Resort for Success
Consequences Action
Climate Change Yes YES YES ???
Biodiversity NO NO NO NO
Forests YES NO NO GOOD
Waste Management NO NO NO NO
Water NO NO NO NO
Ozone Layer Depletion YES NO NO GOOD
Fisheries NO YES MAYBE NO
Oceans NO YES MAYBE NO
Air Pollution NO NO NO YES
Population YES YES YES ???
3.3. Climate Change 
Global warming is perhaps the best publicized global environmental issue. The general
scientific consensus is that it would be prudent to limit future global temperature increase to an
average of two degrees centigrade by 2050. The two-degree target, accepted internationally,20
translates into an atmospheric CO2 concentration level of about 450 parts per million. We were
at 391.76 ppm in February 2011.21
FIGURE 2.  Atmospheric CO2 December 1958 - 2010
22
Figure 3 below presents the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) estimates
of annual gross world CO2 emissions and the impact of the resulting increase of atmospheric
concentration on future temperature increases. Today’s gross global emissions are about
30 billion tonnes. The estimates are that to restrain temperature increases to two degrees, we
will have to cut global CO2 emissions to about 18 billion tonnes by 2050 and to zero by 2100.
If emissions continue to grow to 40 billion tonnes and stabilize at that level, then the
concentration level would be in the 800 ppm range, with global average temperatures rising
between three and seven degrees centigrade. 
Can the G-20 leaders take decisions that will catalyse action to begin to alter the “business as
usual” path, in a world of growing populations and demands for economic development? The
figures below show the scale of the problem. To stabilize concentrations at 450 ppm in 2050
(18 billion tonnes per year), per capita emissions must fall to about two tonnes per capita in
2050 for the world’s estimated nine billion people. Figure 3 illustrates that a two degree
increase above pre-industrial equilibrium temperatures translates into gross global emissions
levelling off at 30 billion tonnes by 2020 and decreasing to zero by 2100. 
20 L'Aquila Chair's summary, page 4, first paragraph on climate change:
http://www.g8italia2009.it/G8/Home/Summit/G8-G8_Layout_locale-1199882116809_Atti.htm 
Copenhagen accord, pg 5, pt 1.
http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=/CP.15#beg (second document on list)
21 http://co2now.org/
22 Source Earth Systems Research Laboratory (ESRL) / National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
image located at http://co2now.org/ 
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FIGURE 3.  CO2 Emissions and Equilibrium Temperature Increases for a Range of Stabilization Levels
23
Figure 4 shows the probability ranges of exceeding two degrees for different levels of CO2
concentration.24
FIGURE 4.  Probability of Future Temperature Changes
Figure 5 shows the per-capita trajectory to stabilize concentrations at 450 ppm. In 2050, to stay
at 450 ppm CO2 (an increase of two degrees), annual emissions must be limited to 18 billion
tonnes.
23 Source: IPCC AR4, 2007. Figure 5.4 Emission Trajectories for Stabilization,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains5-4.html  
24 Critics warn that 450 ppm represents a 26-78% probability of exceeding two degrees.
http://www.securegreenfuture.org/content/ipcc-targets-lead-least-54-odds-catastrophic-climate-change
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FIGURE 5.  Emissions Per Capita for Stabilizing Concentrations at 450 PPM CO2 Equivalent 
(in tonnes of CO2 equivalent per capita)
25
Figure 6 displays the current per-capita emissions for major emitting countries. This demonstrates
the scale of the challenge. India and China will inevitably face inexorable pressures to increase
emissions, with continued economic and population growth. Developed countries will have to
transform their economies or lifestyles to approach two tonnes per capita by 2050.
FIGURE 6. 2007 Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Metric Tonnes of CO2 Per Capita
26
As configured and implemented, the UN process is not working. The UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2009 Copenhagen conference failed to agree to a
comprehensive and legally binding global treaty to supplement or replace the Kyoto Protocol.
Governments tried to put the best face on the Cancun talks. For example, the UK Dept. of
Energy and Climate Change website: 
“The talks marked a turning point in the global negotiations to agree on a global deal to tackle
dangerous climate change.”27 The UK pointed to agreements at the summit reiterating the
25 Source: UNDP (2007) based on Meinshausen, http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=159 0911
26 Source: UN Data www.data.un.org  
27 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/change_energy/tackling_clima/int_climate/cancun/cancun.aspx
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two-degree target to limit temperature rise and to begin work on the building blocks of a future
agreement, including national reports on emissions, a system for monitoring, reporting and
verification, a Green Climate Fund, deforestation, and technology/adaptation mechanisms. But
a typical headline following the 2010 conference was “Cancun Climate Talks a Failure in
Disguise.”28
The United States, China and Japan agreed only to a toothless clause that they would “aim” at
either an extension of the Kyoto Protocol or a new agreement “as early as possible.” No
decision was made on where the money would come from for the Climate Fund (US$100
billion a year by 2020) to assist developing nations with climate change adaptation and green
technology. There is an Alice-in-Wonderland quality to the UN process, whereby developing
countries ignore the constraints of the American political system and the low probability of
congressional appropriation of tens of billions of dollars to a Green Climate Fund for
foreigners. The political realities facing the leaders of developing countries and emerging
economies demand that they provide more growth and higher living standards. To reach an
effective global agreement in the UN, we will have to restructure the UNFCCC process – a
contentious and impractical venture.
4. INEFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
“Scholars and practitioners alike cite fragmentation, overlap and duplication among
the main reasons for reforming the UN’s system of international environmental
governance… In addressing threats to food, energy and water security and grappling
with the impacts of climate change, states are currently dealing with an array of
United Nations agencies, financial institutions and mechanisms, private sector
interests and civil society organizations… According to information on 18 MEAs
between 1992 and 2007, there were 540 meetings, which resulted in more than
5000 resolutions or decisions… Institutional overlap and fragmentation are widely
regarded as detrimental to efficient and effective governance… Incoherence and
complexity in the international environmental governance system can lead to high
transaction costs, discouraging in some cases participation in the system by
developing countries and countries with economies in transition.”
http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2010/PDF/year_book_2010.pdf
This section reviews the international efforts to manage the issues described in the ten
environmental issues. A Martian observing the institutions, mechanisms and arrangements
“governing” international affairs today would likely compare the current situation to a large
opera company, composed of both divas and amateurs but without a director, a symphony
orchestra of talented soloists without a conductor (playing the same music but on different
pages), or a ballet company of prima donnas without a choreographer. The mandates, the
resources and decision-making rules of the many different international environmental
institutions are accidents of history. There is no means to orchestrate or choreograph activities
to ensure coordination, coherence and/or timely updating of mandates. 
27 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/change_energy/tackling_clima/int_climate/cancun/cancun.aspx
28 http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2871&Itemid=391 
10
“We have limped along over the past 20 to 30 years with institutions designed for a
postwar world that are slow to respond and increasingly out of alignment with the
challenge of the day.” – Adam Matthews Global Governance December ISSUE 15:4 2009 p.
451
There is a strong argument that major efforts should be made to strengthen global
environmental governance. Today’s challenges (economic downturn, climate change, energy
security, poverty, and ecosystem breakdown) cannot be resolved using the institutional
frameworks and governance structures that were designed for a post-Second World War
equilibrium. The existing international bodies responsible for tackling these current challenges
are separate, disparate and not sufficiently “joined up.” There are over 250 multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) dealing with various environmental issues currently in
force.29 Dozens of international organizations have some degree of environmental
responsibility. “We have disconnected institutions responding to an interconnected world.”30
The “organization chart” of the international bodies responsible for managing elements of the
global environment resembles a Rorschach inkblot or a surreal painting by Kadinsky.
FIGURE 7. Environmental Organizations 
The UNEP and independent secretariats manage an array of multilateral environment
agreements. There are separate UN conventions for endangered species, biodiversity, wetlands,
pesticides and chemicals, persistent organic pollutants, trans-boundary disposal of hazardous
wastes, ozone, desertification and heritage. These various entities often do not “play” well
together. There is no effective means to set consistent priorities, achieve systematic division of
labour, rationalize budgets or pursue synergies across issues. The international institutional
framework is sector-based, whereas environmental issues are inherently cross-sectoral. The
UNEP, based in Nairobi, cannot be expected to coordinate all these independent bodies’
scientific research, financing and policy initiatives.
To support systematic management of international ecological interdependence, Dan Esty
makes the case for a modern organization, with core functions to support policy-making, data
collection, science exchange and a “best practices clearing house,” with a funding mechanism,
a structure for monitoring treaty compliance, a negotiating forum and a dispute settlement
mechanism.31
29 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm 
30 Adam Mathews, “A Role for Legislators,” Global Governance, 15 (2009), 451-6.
31 Dan Esty, “Revitalizing Global Environmental Governance for Climate Change,” Global Governance, 15 (2009),
427-434. 
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“International environmental protection is a classic public good that tends to be
underprovided…The current structure, centred on UNEP, is chronically underfunded,
lacks broad-based political support and continues to fall short of expectations.”
– Secretatariat of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, Sustainable Management of
the Global Nattural Commons, Expert Paper 2, Global Commons, Chapter 4
FIGURE 8. Number of New Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Protocols, and Amendments 1998-200932
5. MOST PROMISING ROUTES TO G-20 ENGAGEMENT
5.1. What Do Leaders Do?
There is considerable scepticism about the prospects of G-20 action on climate change. Non-
governmental organizations’ (NGOs) verdict on the Seoul G-20 summit was not a happy one.
The assessment on the Seoul summit from Greenpeace was “The G-20 has once again failed to
take the path of green development that the world economy and the environment desperately
needs…The G-20 can use flowery words to plaster over deep differences in economic policy,
but that will do nothing to alleviate poverty or save the climate.”33 Tck Tck Tck “was very
disappointed that the G-20 only discussed climate over lunch, having added the issue to the
agenda at the last minute and only at the request of the Europeans… the G-20 dropped a
reaffirmation of the commitment to keep global warming below two degrees in the final
version of the communiqué and failed to take action on fossil fuel subsidies.”34
32 Source Mitchell 2009. www.unep.org/pdf/year_book_2010.pdf 
33 Daniel Mittler, Greenpeace International Political Director http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/News/news/G20-
fails-to-commit-to-an-energy-revolution/
34 The Sherpa Times http://www.sherpatimes.com/g20/280-ngos-verdict-on-seoul-qyes-butq.html  
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What are reasonable expectations for an ambitious G-20 agenda? With respect to global
environmental issues, what expectations are in the politically feasible set? Bear in mind the
complexity of the topics, leaders’ lack of technical expertise, the facts of different languages
and different cultural approaches to decision-making and the relatively short meeting time.
The G-20 meetings are informal, without any provisions for compliance and enforcement. The
G-20 is a self-appointed group of countries. Non-members hotly contest the legitimacy of any
G-20 decisions purporting to extend to other countries and the G-20 cannot make binding
decisions. However, from past summits such as the G-8, the G-20 and others, there are many
examples of the kinds of decisions leaders can make. Leaders can:
•    Commit themselves to specific actions.
•    Agree to instruct their Ministers and officials to work toward specific ends.
•    Agree to have their representatives in international organizations work together to reach
some objective.
•    Establish expert groups to make recommendations.
•    Invite international organizations to prepare reports on specified questions.
•    Create new networks or international organizations and invite other countries to join.
Then what are the prospects for effective G-20 engagement with environmental issues? 
5.2. Climate Change and Past G-20 Meetings
Climate change has made a brief appearance at each of the past five G-20 leaders’ meetings:
• The Washington G-20 communiqué was anodyne with respect to international
environmental issues, mentioning in passing with other global issues: “We remain
committed to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security and climate
change, food security, the rule of law and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease.”35
• London touted the agreement “to make the best possible use of investment funded by fiscal
stimulus programmes towards the goal of building a resilient, sustainable and green
recovery. We will make the transition towards clean, innovative, resource-efficient, low
carbon technologies and infrastructure.” It also reaffirmed commitments “to address the
threat of irreversible climate change, based on the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and to reach agreement at the UN Climate Change conference in
Copenhagen in December 2009.”36
• Pittsburgh focused on inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and the stimulation of investment in
clean energy, renewables and energy efficiency and the diffusion or transfer of clean energy
technology, as well as climate-change financing.37
• The Toronto declaration reiterated commitments to the UNFCCC process, reaffirmed
support for the Copenhagen accord and accepted (passively) the report on energy subsidies.
It recognized the need to act to prevent marine oil spills.38
35 http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/resources/125136.htm 
36 http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8622_en.htm 
37 http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm 
38 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html
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• The G-20 Seoul summit Leader Declaration reaffirmed the commitment to fight climate
change. The 74-paragraph Seoul summit document devoted three paragraphs to climate
change. It reaffirmed past commitments, introduced the on-going loss of biodiversity linked
to climate change and listed initiatives for country-led green growth policies and clean
energy.39
The next section suggests an approach to address climate change in the G-20. 
6. A G-20 APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE: FIVE ELEMENTS 
With respect to climate change, the UN negotiation process will not succeed in the future; the
prospects are for continuing deadlock within the UNFCCC. China, India and Brazil will
continue to resist any binding commitments that would compromise their economic
development and insist that only the developed countries, historically responsible for the
increase in atmospheric CO2, should be held to legally enforceable reductions. Smaller
developing countries will continue to insist on massive financial transfers to assist them with
green technology and adaptation to inevitable climate change. 
The harsh political reality is that there is no prospect for a global agreement on national
emissions reductions, nor any prospects for Congressional appropriation of tens of billions of
dollars of hoped-for climate change financing. Progress on the Copenhagen commitment for
fast-start funds is cause for pessimism. The Copenhagen Accord fast-start funds40 were to be
“new and additional,” amounting to $30 billion USD in 2010-2012 and rising to $100 billion
USD a year by 2020. While close to $30 billion has been pledged, delivery is uncertain. Only
$6.8 billion USD has been requested and/or budgeted by the executive bodies of the countries
in 2010-2011.41 In some cases, legislative bodies have also approved these requests. Some
countries have budgeted funds while others have yet to complete national budget
appropriations processes. This is despite the Seoul G-20 meeting’s commitment of support:
“We also support and encourage the delivery of fast-start finance commitments.”42
“New and additional” funding means an increase relative to previous years’ pledges or
allocations. In fact, a number of pledges are renamed commitments already made in the past.
For example, Japan’s Hatoyama Initiative is a restructuring of the previously announced
Japanese Cool Earth Partnership, with some new resources included in the Initiative. (Imagine
the impact of the March tsunami and nuclear disaster on the likelihood of future large Japanese
contributions). Countries such as the UK and the US are counting previous commitments to the
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) as part of their fast-start finance pledge. Historically, there is
a striking discrepancy between financial pledges and disbursements from developed to
developing countries.43 In any case, what are the prospects of Canada providing $4 billion
USD a year (Canada’s traditional share is four percent) in 2020 and beyond?
39 http://media.seoulsummit.kr/contents/dlobo/E1._Seoul_Summit_Leaders_Declaration.pdf 
40 The Copenhagen financial commitments are found at http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-
fast-start-climate-finance-pledges
41 Ibid. See also faststartfinance.org  (initiated by the Dutch government). 
42 Para 66 of the G-20 Seoul summit leaders’ declaration http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-
sommet/2010/g20_seoul_declaration.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=41&menu=L 
43 South Centre,  Developed Country Climate Financing Initiatives Weaken the UNFCCC
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=909&Itemid=1 
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Any effective deal requires full participation by China and the US. Major Chinese and
American concerns (perceived threats to national competitiveness, the costs of alternative
technology development and energy security) need to be resolved before any agreement on
climate change can be negotiated in multilateral fora. These concerns can be addressed by
negotiating distinct agreements, preceding any discussion of binding targets on emission
reductions or financial transfers. A grand bargain could be devised combining a series of
distinct agreements – action on inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, future standards and border tax
adjustments, R&D cooperation and investments in energy security of supply. 
The G-20 offers a more propitious route to an ultimate global agreement than the 192-member
United Nations. Imagine an incremental process. First, prior to any serious negotiation on
emission targets or financial transfers for climate change, the G-20 could negotiate amongst
themselves six elements of a grand bargain, six essential confidence-building prerequisites to
an eventual deal on binding targets. Then, after the G-20 successfully concluded the grand
bargain, they could subsequently agree amongst themselves on the elements of a binding deal
on targets. The G-20 could then champion a deal on targets in the UNFCCC process. If China
and the US can agree on an approach to climate change, other G-20 countries could be
persuaded to sign on. The French team organizing the 2011 G-20 summit, or the Mexicans in
2012, could design an informal process that would bring China and the US together to
negotiate the prerequisite agreements, building on the existing bilateral US-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue. The prospects for French or Mexican shuttle diplomacy are better than
previous diplomatic efforts like the 1978 Camp David accord44 mediated by Jimmy Carter in
1978 or the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, mediated by Richard Holbrooke.
Six elements of a grand bargain could be:
• A  campaign of “no regrets” emission-abatement investments; 
• Action on inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. 
• Agreement on future standards on traded GHG-intensive goods and border tax adjustments
on below-standard products.
• Agreement on R&D cooperation, addressing intellectual property issues.
• Agreement on investments in energy security of supply, sharing emergency reserve stocks
and investing in LNG infrastructure.
• Strengthening international environmental organizations 
6.1. “No Regrets” Emission Abatements – The McKinsey Curve
The first element of the grand bargain would be a campaign in G-20 countries to promote
emission-abatement investments that are actually profitable. There are extensive opportunities
for investments to reduce emissions that more than pay for themselves. Figure 9 provides a
heuristic sketch. Of course, opportunities vary dramatically by country. G-20 members could
commit to energetically and systematically pursuing all profitable investments in each of their
own countries. They could catalyze the effort by inviting several international organizations to
cooperate in monitoring and reporting progress and in actively promoting information on
opportunities and best practices.
44 http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=camp+david+accord+signed&rlz=1W1ADBF_en&aq=
7v&aqi=g5g-v5&aql=&oq=Camp+David+accord+&gs_rfai= 
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FIGURE 9. Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve Beyond Business-as-Usual – 203045
6.2. Inefficient Fossil Fuel Subsidies
The Pittsburgh remit on fossil fuel subsidies is an interesting example of the G-20 requesting
international organizations to prepare a report. The IEA, OECD, and World Bank presented a
joint report for the November 2010 Seoul summit.46 This G-20-commissioned report reviewed
the over $300 billion in direct fossil fuel subsidies as well as indirect subsidies through tax
expenditures, under-priced access to government controlled resources and land, and
concessional loans and guarantees. It concluded that G-20 agreement to phase out fossil fuel
subsidies by 2020 would represent a “triple-win” solution, enhancing energy security, reducing
GHG emissions, and bringing immediate economic gains. It would cut global energy demand
by five percent and reduce oil demand by 4.7 million barrels per day. The report notes “It
would also represent an integral building block for tackling climate change,” cutting growth in
CO2 emissions by two gigatonnes.
47 It is in the national self-interest of each G-20 country to
phase out fossil fuel subsidies. 
45 Source: Global GHG Assessment Cost Curve v2.0.  http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/Costcurves.asp 
46
“The Scope of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in 2009 and a Road Map for Phasing out Fossil Fuel Subsidies”
http://www.iea.org/weo/docs/second_joint_report.pdf 
47 While the subsidies at issue are primarily regressive, the report discusses alternatives to provide compensation for
any negative impact on the poor.
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6.3. Standards and Border Tax Adjustments
The G-20 could agree on future product and process standards on high-carbon traded goods. A
universal product-by-product standard is not required. Standards could be enforced by border tax
adjustments on goods “below the standards.” With sufficient notice, this would be feasible for
basic industries like cement and aluminum (which are already engaged in designing more rigorous
standards), and for high-volume industries that are highly integrated across borders. Ultimately, a
monitoring and reporting system, with verification, possibly based on peer review around
commonly agreed refined standards, would be the core of an agreement on truly global action.
6.4. R&D Cooperation
There are several examples of successful international cooperative research efforts that could
serve as a model for the G-20.
• ITER, an international experiment to produce commercial energy from fusion, consists of
member countries that share every aspect of the project: science, procurements, finance and
staffing, with the long-term aim that each member will have the know-how to produce its
own fusion energy plant.48
• The Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) generates cutting
edge science through a “strategic partnership whose donors support 15 international centres,
working in collaboration with many hundreds of government and civil society organizations
as well as private businesses around the world ...The new crop varieties, knowledge and
other products resulting from the CGIAR’s collaborative research are made widely
available to individuals and organizations working for sustainable agricultural development
throughout the world.”49
• The China Greentech Initiative interactive website “designed to facilitate the collection,
analysis and sharing of research on the evolving greentech market in China…is an open
source, commercial collaboration of over 80 of the world's leading technology and services
companies, entrepreneurs, investors, NGOs and policy advisors.”50
• The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate includes America,
Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan and Korea. These countries work together and with
private sector partners to accelerate the development and deployment of clean energy
technologies.  
The G-20 could build on the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF),51
launched just two years ago. All G-20 countries except Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are
represented in the MEF. In addition to promoting dialogue and assisting the UNFCCC process,
the MEF was intended to explore initiatives and joint ventures to increase the supply of clean
energy and cut emissions. They are developing plans on ten technologies: advanced vehicles,
bioenergy, carbon capture, building sector energy efficiency, industrial sector energy efficiency,
low emissions coal, marine energy, smart grids, solar power and wind energy.
48
www.iter.org
49
www.cgiar.org
50
www.china-greentech.com
51 http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/mem/ 
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These ideas should not be dismissed because they are Bush-era initiatives. R&D cooperation
may be a minor part of the answer, but it is key to building confidence and to generating
political support for other policies and elements of a package deal.
6.5 Security of Supply
In the name of security of supply, the G-20 leaders could agree to expand and transform the
International Energy Agency (IEA), currently an autonomous OECD organization. The IEA
was initially established to respond to physical disruptions in the supply of oil. Its members
agreed to maintain national emergency oil reserves and to plan for coordinated use of those
reserves. They also agreed to cooperate on other national measures, including demand restraint,
the coordination of effective national emergency organizations, as well as testing response
measures and providing training emergency situations. Most important, the IEA provides for a
system for sharing and reallocation of available supplies in emergencies.52
All the G-20 members could be invited to join the IEA. Ten G-20 countries, including
Australia, Korea and Turkey are already members. With China, India and Russia as members,
the IEA could effectively enhance security in the world energy markets. More importantly, an
expanded IEA could create a worldwide gas market by promoting initiatives to increase
investment and reduce regulatory barriers in natural gas infrastructure.
Natural gas, at half the carbon intensity of coal in power generation, offers great potential for
near-term GHG reduction. Natural gas vehicles have a GHG footprint that is 20 percent
reduced relative to their gasoline-powered equivalents. By most estimates, global demand for
natural gas will double by 2030. However, in North America, Europe, China and South and
East Asia, which are the areas of highest-expected demand, the projected consumption of gas is
expected to far outstrip indigenous supplies. The world liquefied natural gas (LNG) market,
with major suppliers in Algeria, Australia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and
Venezuela, could become similar to the world market for oil. Delivering gas from the world's
major reserves to the future demand centres will require a major expansion of inter-regional,
cross-border gas transport infrastructures.
Making the prospects for natural gas even brighter is a revolution in the last several years in
technology for extracting “unconventional” gas that was previously inaccessible.
Unconventional gas resources include gas in coal deposits (coal bed methane, CBM) or in
shale rocks that have too few pores for the gas to move freely and be extracted by conventional
wells.53 “The US-led revolution in techniques for extracting unconventional gas has challenged
previous assumptions about global gas supply.”54
52 http://www.iea.org/papers/2004/factsheetcover.pdf 
53 http://pesd.stanford.edu/research/gas/
54 PESD Policy Brief, Mark Thurber May 18, 2010 http://pesd.stanford.edu/research/gas/ This is by no means without
controversy given fugitive emissions, demand for water and other environmental consequences. See Ian Urbina
series, Drilling Down, NYTimes, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/us/series/drilling_down/index.html 
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The G-20 could encourage initiatives to increase the role of LNG connections of regional
markets and explore the potential for natural gas to play a larger role in China and India.
Natural gas makes up only about four percent of China's energy supply at present. Chinese
discoveries of substantial unconventional gas resources would immediately align domestic gas
development with both energy security and air quality goals. The G-20 could encourage the
replacement of other fossil fuels with gas by removing fossil fuel subsidies and cooperating on
infrastructure investments. The G-20 could include promotion of R&D and the widespread
application of new technologies to access “unconventional gas.”
6.6 Strengthening International Environmental Organizations
The G-20 could reinforce a grand bargain by strengthening several international environmental
organizations, addressing the weaknesses described in Section 5 above. There is a long history
of the G-7 initiating changes in international organizations and there are several examples of
the G-20 leading the push for reforms of the IMF and World Bank. Indeed, the G-20 created
the newest major international organization – the Financial Stability Board. Agreement in the
G-20 could trigger a welcome strengthening of the mandates and resources of the UNEP and
the UNFCCC. The disparate secretariats of the various UN environmental conventions could
be reorganized into clusters or a more coherent organization. Other ideas to explore include
expanding the role of the Global Ministerial Environment Forum, building up the
environmental competence of the WTO, reforming the UN Trusteeship Council and
establishing a World Environment Court. They may even initiate creation of a powerful “World
Environment Organization.”55 In any case, the G-20 could establish a working group to
propose options for strengthening the various MEA Convention Secretariats, to reinforce the
UNEP, and to develop alternatives for the mandate, resources and decision- making process for
a World Environment Organization. One of the trial balloons may fly.
6.7 Conclusions on Climate Change 
There are good reasons for scepticism regarding the prospects for the G-20 to agree on the
initial six elements for a grand bargain tackling climate change. Investments in most climate
change policies and projects have amortization periods of 10-25 years or longer, but
governments find it very difficult to look and invest beyond two to three years. It may be
particularly difficult for governments to engage in meaningful coordinated action on energy
security. For example, a strategy to boost investment in spare capacity requires Saudi Arabia’s
participation. A strategy to boost investment in alternative supplies might be opposed by low-
cost oil suppliers. It may be difficult for governments to promote and coordinate large R&D
projects without them becoming patronage-ridden. The intellectual property issues may prove
difficult to resolve. 
Certainly it would be ideal if the G-20 could forge a deal on binding national emission targets
and large financial transfers to developing countries. But “the perfect is the enemy of the
good.” The prospects for a package deal pursuing “no-regrets” abatements, fossil fuel
subsidies, R&D, product and process standards, security of supply and strengthening of
international institutions are brighter than for a deal on targets and transfers from developed
countries of hundreds of billions of dollars. 
55 See Steve Charnovitz’s “A World Environment Organization” for a convincing and pragmatic argument.
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/6ad8618d-6535-4a81-8046-
cd084016b0f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d61941b0-fa16-4ad1-9e19-254449cf83be/Charnovitz1.pdf  
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7. CONCLUSION
“Politicians are caught in a dilemma between political suicide and ecological suicide.”
– Mathis Wackernagel
Unless Sarkozy changes his mind and decides to make the environment a priority, highly
unlikely given current events, the responsibility will fall on the Mexicans in 2012. There are
major obstacles to G-20 action on international environmental issues. The dangerous downside
risks occur in the distant future, but policies and actions that lessen warming have immediate
costs. Some countries, like Russia, see positives in global warming including lower heating
costs and better agricultural and timber harvests. Any concerted action will require the
wholehearted participation of China and the US. 
Both China and the US have many urgent issues that take precedence over climate change and
other environmental issues. China’s priority is fueling economic growth and employment to
maintain domestic political stability. US attention is fully absorbed by several international
security issues (e.g., Libya, Afghanistan-Pakistan, North Korea, the Middle East) and the
economic fallout of the financial crisis (debt, unemployment, external imbalances). They are
unlikely to urge France to add environmental issues to Sarkozy’s announced list of priorities
(reform of the international monetary system, strengthened financial sector regulation,
commodity price volatility, employment, corruption and development).56 Even if the US
pushed, it faces a credibility problem – doubts that the US administration can deliver on
commitments – given the dysfunctional gridlock of its domestic political system. 
A G-20 package would go part way to resolving the climate change dilemma, provide some
essential early action and could lead to improved prospects for an agreement on binding targets
for emission reductions. If leadership is required, Mexico is a better bet in 2012. Proponents of
G-20 action should focus on supporting the Mexicans and subsequent G-20 Presidents. 
56 http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/dossiers-de-presse/2010/dossier-de-presse-de-presentation-de-la-
presidence.10496.html  & http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/priorities-for-france/the-priorities-of-the-
french-presidency/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency.75.html 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
3G Global Governance Group
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union 
BRIICS Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa 
CEB                    Chief Executives Board
CGIAR Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research 
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
G-20 Group of Twenty
GHG Greenhouse Gases
IADB                   Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA                   International Atomic Energy Agency 
IEA International Energy Association
ILO International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LPI Living Planet Index
MA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MEF Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NFA National Footprint Accounts 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program 
UNCSD               United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WANO                World Association of Nuclear Operators
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wildlife Fund
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ANNEX 1
A1. Biodiversity
Biodiversity and the world’s ecosystems are under threat. Biodiversity refers to the worldwide
variety (13 million species) of plants, animals and organisms.57 Ecosystems provide oxygen,
food, fresh water, fertile soil, medicines, shelter, protection from storms and floods, stable
climate and recreation. Agriculture, energy security and protection from fires and flooding
strongly depend on biodiversity.58 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment concluded that
problematic management of our ecosystems has caused loss of biodiversity and ecosystem
degradation. In the last half of the previous century, and as a result of human activity,
ecosystems changed at a rate greater than in any comparable period of time in human history.59
Species’ extinctions are continuing at up to 1,000 times the natural rate60 and are irreversible.
Although extinction is a natural process and today’s species represent only two to four percent
of all species that have ever lived, the high number of recent extinctions suggests the world is
facing a rapid net loss of biodiversity.
This disturbing assessment is confirmed by work of the International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP). According to the IUCN’s Red List, 17,291 species are under threat out of
the 47,677 assessed: 21 percent of all known mammals, 30 percent of all known amphibians,
12 percent of all known birds, 28 percent of all known reptiles, 38 percent of all known
freshwater fishes, 70 percent of all known plants and 35 percent of all known invertebrates.61
The WWF’s Living Planet Index (LPI) calculates global trends in populations by averaging
three ecosystem-based population indices (terrestrial, freshwater and marine). The LPI dropped
by approximately 40 percent between 1970 and 2000, with a 30 percent drop in the terrestrial
species populations index, 30 percent in the marine species populations index and 50 percent in
the freshwater species population index. Although criticized for taxonomic and regional bias,
and far from being a comprehensive assessment of the planet’s species, the LPI reveals
downward trends for well-known taxa and regions. The global decline of commercially
important fish stocks is widely reported: most industrial fisheries are either fully or
overexploited and many marine populations will not be able to recover from severe depletion,
even if fishing is suspended.62
57 http://www.cbd.int/2010/biodiversity/ 
58
www.iucn.org/iyb/about/biodiversity 
59
www.maweb.org/documents/document.273.aspx.pdf
60
www.iucn.org/iyb/about/biodiversity_crisis/  
61 http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/red-list-overview 
62
www.maweb.org/documents/document.273.aspx.pdf
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FIGURE A1. Red List Status of Species by Major Groups, 200963
The numbers above each bar represent the total number of extant species assessed for each
group. CR – Critically Endangered, EN – Endangered, VU – Vulnerable, NT – Near
Threatened, DD – Data Deficient, LC – Least Concern.
FIGURE A2. Sources of Losses in Mean Species Abundance to 203064
63 Source IUCN. http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/summary-statistics#Fig_2 
64 OECD Environmental Outlook Baseline http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/261161731365
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A UNEP team of researchers identified nine components of Earth’s systems that show signs of
global environmental change and suggested a safe space or boundary in which human activity
can operate to sustain the planet’s natural systems.65 Biodiversity loss is considered to have
surpassed the boundary designating safe operating space for human activities.66 Population and
economic growth contribute to biodiversity loss as a result of land-use changes, unsustainable
use of natural resources and pollution, climate change and our increasing demands for food,
fresh water, timber, fuel, and fibre. Habitat loss through clearing or degradation is currently the
primary cause of range declines in species and populations.67
According to the OECD, a considerable number of today’s known animal and plant species are
likely to become extinct, largely due to expanding infrastructure and agriculture, as well as
climate change. Food and biofuel production together will require a ten percent increase in
farmland worldwide with a further loss of wildlife habitat.68 Climate change takes its toll on
rich marine habitats like coral reefs, not just with rising temperatures but also increasing
absorption rates of carbon dioxide, with an increasing rate of ocean acidification. The reefs
serve as habitat for nearly a quarter of the globe’s marine fish species, many of which struggle
to adapt to acidification.69 In sum, the continuing loss of biodiversity is likely to limit the
Earth’s capacity to provide the valuable ecosystem services that support economic growth and
human well-being.
A.2. Forestry
In 2005, forests accounted for 30 percent of earth’s total land area.70 Forests are the most
biodiversity-rich terrestrial ecosystems and provide a variety of habitats for plants, animals and
micro-organisms. Forests are invaluable sources of timber, pulp and paper, rubber and
environmental services; they also regulate the climate and represent a major carbon reservoir.  
Deforestation, degradation and fragmentation threaten forest biodiversity. About 45 percent of
the Earth’s original forest cover has disappeared – most in the past century. Factors that
degrade forests, aside from unsustainable forest management, include conversion to
agricultural land, overgrazing, introduction of invasive alien plant and animal species,
infrastructure development, mining and oil exploitation, anthropogenic forest fires, pollution
and climate change.71 Natural disasters and invasive species cause severe damage in some
regions. Deforestation in Australia is increasing because of droughts and forest fires. In western
Canada, the mountain pine beetle has destroyed more than 11 million hectares of forest since
the late 1990s. 
65 Biodiversity loss, nitrogen and phosphoric cycle, climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion,
chemical pollution, atmospheric aerosol loading, change in land use, global freshwater use
www.unep.org/yearbook/2010/PDF/year_book_2010.pdf p.13
66 Ibid p.13
67
www.iucn.org 
68 OECD, 2010, p.198. 
69 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/devastation-beneath-seas?utm_source=newsletter1&utm_medium=email&utm
_campaign=YGNewsletter
70
www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3746,en_2649_37465_39676628_1_1_1_37465,00.html 
71
www.cbd.int/forest/problem.html 
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The FAO has been monitoring the world’s forests at five and ten-year intervals for the past
60 years. They recently released the Forests Resources Assessment Report 2010,72 which
reported a positive trend in forest management: the slowing of the conversion of forests to
other uses or lost to natural causes in the last decade from 16 million hectares per year in the
1990s to 13 million hectares per year in the last decade. The OECD anticipates this
deforestation to cause a decrease in forest cover of 13 percent from 2005 to 2030, with the
greatest rates in South Asia and Africa.73
To avoid the destruction of forests, there has been an increase in the area of forest designated
for conservation of biological diversity, now accounting for 12 percent of all forest area. Large-
scale planting of trees and natural expansion of forests have reduced the net loss of forest area
globally. Plantation forests, however, differ from natural forests in their degree of biodiversity
(much less), soil structure, chemical composition and regional hydrological cycle, and can
cause large water depletion in local basins.74 Forests are becoming increasingly prominent in
climate change negotiations as stakeholders recognize their importance in regulating the
climate – especially in developing countries. Deforestation accounts for approximately
20 percent of anthropogenic GHG emissions. 
FIGURE A3. Net Change in Forest Area by Country, 2005-2010 (ha/year)75
72
www.fao.org/forestry/fra/en 
73 OECD, 2008.
74 OECD, 2008. 
75 Source: Global Forest Resource Assessment, Key Findings, http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/en/ 
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A.3. Water
Clean water is imperative for human well-being and healthy ecosystems. Fresh water is the
most important resource on the planet. It is essential for drinking, food security for millions of
the world’s poor, climate regulation, flood mitigation, nutrient recycling, water purification and
waste treatment.76 Access to safe drinking water is a global public good. Several experts have
typecast water as the “oil of the 21st century,” classifying it as “the most precious
commodity.”77 Fresh water is a scarce resource and a limiting factor for development. 
Currently, 25 percent of people live in areas with insufficient water to support them and
44 percent of people live in areas of “high-stress.”78 By 2030, in absolute numbers, there will
be 3.9 billion people living in such conditions. The OECD predicts water scarcity will worsen
due to unsustainable resource use and management as well as climate change. More than five
billion people are expected to be without a connection to public sewerage in 2030 – 1.1 billion
more than today. 
FIGURE A4. People (millions) in Areas of Water Stress, by Level of Stress, 2005 and 203079
In OECD countries, the greatest demands for water come from irrigation, mainly for
agriculture (43 percent), electrical cooling and industry (42 percent) and public water supply
(15 percent).80 In developing countries, the predominant demand is from agriculture. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, even where water is available, the infrastructure needed for people to access it
is absent or poorly maintained. In this regard, the problem is not necessarily water’s
availability but the ability to store, deliver and use it efficiently. The increasing pressures of
climate change, population growth, urbanization and evolving energy needs are putting
unprecedented pressure on our finite freshwater resources.81
76
www.cbd.int/waters/importance 
77 An article in Fortune Magazine in May 2000 used this statement to indicate that water was the “precious commodity
that determines the wealth of nations”. Cited in http://www.investmentu.com/2010/March/the-water-industry-and-
blue-gold.html; and http://www.alive.com/4065a3a2.php?subject_bread_cramb=59 
78 State of the World Atlas 2009. 
79 Source: OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 – OECD 2008 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/258506125571 
80 OECD, 2008, p.221.
81
www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/The-Urgency-of-Water-Security/ 
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FIGURE A5. Lake Chad Drainage Basin 1972 to 200582
As an example of the pressures put on these sources, the picture below, figure A5, depicts the
impact over time (1972-2007) on Lake Chad. Less rainfall and increased water consumption by
the area’s inhabitants (20 million people from eight countries: Algeria, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan) have changed the
water balance in the basin area. As a result of lower rainfall and greater water usage, the
shallow lake’s surface area decreased 95 percent from 1972 to 2005.83
Scientists anticipate climate change will significantly affect the hydrological cycle.84 A warmer
climate will shift precipitation and evaporation patterns, aggravating water stress while extreme
weather events will increase heat waves, droughts and flooding.
A.4. Air Pollution (Acid Rain)
Air pollution is a ubiquitous problem in cities around the world. Lead, ozone, carbon monoxide
and volatile organic compounds are common pollutants. Three of the most dangerous types of
air pollution, however, are sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter (PM).85 PM is
suspended in air and composed of a complex mix of solid and liquid particles of organic and
inorganic substances including sulfates, nitrates, ammonia, sodium chloride, carbon, mineral
dust and water.86 Industrial processes, vehicle emissions, power plants, and the burning of
fossil fuels are the main source of air pollution. Air pollution affects local and global air quality
because PM can exist for several days (local impacts) to several weeks, allowing it to travel on
air currents across continents. Other pollutants – methane, ozone, and carbon monoxide – are
longer lasting, migrating long distances and affecting different parts of the environment.87
82 Source: Atlas of Our Changing World.  www.unep.org/yearbook/2010/PDF/year_book_2010.pdf 
83
www.unep.org/yearbook/2010/PDF/year_book_2010.pdf 
84 OECD, 2008. 
85
www.earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/325 
86 Ibid. 
87 OECD Outlook 2030. 
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The health impacts of air pollution are projected to increase worldwide. The WHO states that
air pollution is a major risk to health and estimated to cause two million premature deaths each
year.88 The serious risks to health are a result of exposure to PM and ozone. 
Particles are identified by their diameter. Smaller particles are more dangerous to humans
because of their ability to enter the body and affect gas exchange in the lungs. Effects of
exposure to PM include: respiratory death in children less than a year old, increasing number
of deaths from respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, and lung cancer.89 Ground-level ozone
is toxic to humans. It forms when sunlight reacts with pollutants from vehicle and industry
emissions.90 Ozone is one of the major components of smog, and the highest levels occur
during sunny weather, causing breathing problems, asthma, reduced lung function and lung
diseases.91
There is a global trend of urbanization. As cities expand, the growing population’s energy and
transport needs will create more emissions.92 The WHO estimates that more than half the
burden from air pollution on human health is borne by people in developing countries. This is
likely a result of indoor exposure to pollutants from traditional cooking methods and fuel
combustion. The WHO set targets for the concentration in air of PM and in many cities, the
annual average is more than three times the acceptable level.93 In addition to health effects, air
pollution has adverse impacts on vegetation and ecosystems.
Acid rain, precipitation with high levels of nitric and sulfuric acid, occurs naturally from
decomposing vegetation and volcanoes but is mainly a result of human activity – heating
homes, producing electricity, driving vehicles94 – or activities that combust fossil fuels.95
Nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide (SO2) and ammonia deposits acidify terrestrial and
freshwater ecosystems, damaging lakes, streams, forests, plants and animals. 
The buildup of excess nitrogen disturbs the function and structure of ecosystems and is thought
to cause loss of biodiversity and excessive algae blooming on surface waters.96 Acidic waters
are toxic to crayfish, clams, fish and other aquatic animals. Acid rain also damages forests by
disrupting trees’ ability to absorb water and by bonding with other nutrients in the soil, making
them unavailable for uptake.97 Most developed countries have taken deliberate steps to reduce
their emissions of SO2, one of the key pollutants responsible for acid rain.
98 For example, from
1980 to 1999, eastern Canada cut its emissions of SO2 by more than half.99 Unfortunately,
developing countries’ standards on SO2 emissions are not as strict as developed countries, and
as such, acid rain will continue to be a problem, especially in Asia. 
88
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/index.html 
89 OECD Outlook 2030.
90
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/index.html
91 Ibid.
92 OECD Outlook 2030. 
93
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/index.html
94
www.epa.gov/acidrain/what/index.html  
95 http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/acid-rain-overview.html 
96 OECD, 2008, p.181. 
97 Ibid. 
98
www.earthtrends.wri.org/text/climate-atmosphere/feature-27.html  
99
www.msc-smc.ec.gc.ca/cd/factsheets/acidrain/index_e.cfm 
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FIGURE A6. Annual Average Ambient Air Quality in Selected Asian Cities (1993-2008)100 
Successful policies and efforts in OECD countries have reduced air pollution and most of these
countries have decoupled air pollution from economic growth. In non-OECD countries,
however, particularly China and those in continental Asia, economic growth has not yet been
decoupled from air pollution. Air pollution and emissions will continue to grow through 2030.101
A.5. Waste Management 
Recent decades have seen unprecedented growth in population and economic well-being.
Resource and material consumption have fed this growth and have had adverse environmental
impacts. Resource extraction moves huge amounts of materials, creating huge amounts of
waste and unused materials (from mining overburden, fisheries by catch and harvest losses),
disrupting ecosystems or habitats and altering landscapes.102 A continuously growing demand
for raw materials will be matched by a continuous rise in the amount of waste produced to fuel
economic activity.
Hazardous waste is produced from manufacturing processes, chemical and petroleum industries
and other industrial sectors. Examples of hazardous wastes include acids, alkalis, solvents,
medical waste, resins, sludge and heavy metals. Hazardous wastes require special technology
for their disposal because they are potentially dangerous to human health, terrestrial and
aquatic ecosystems and the environment.103 According to the best estimates available to OECD
researchers, OECD countries alone generated approximately 115 million tonnes of hazardous
waste in 1997 – 2.7 percent of total waste. In the 25 countries of the EU, hazardous waste
increased between 1998 and 2002 by 13 percent.104
100 Source: Clean Air for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia) Center, 2010. Air Quality in Asia: Status and Trends – 2010 Edition.
Pasig City, Philippines.
101 OECD, 2008, p.178.
102 Ibid, p.241.
103 http://www.environmentalindicators.com/htdocs/indicators/12haza.htm 
104 Ibid. 
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Although not traditionally considered hazardous waste, waste from end-of-life electric and
electronic appliances is creating a challenge in both developed and developing countries. The
world generates an estimated 20-50 million tonnes of “e-waste” every year and this is the
fastest growing form of waste in the EU, totaling 6-7 million tonnes annually.105 Since the late
1990s, OECD countries have managed to stabilize their generation of non-hazardous industrial
waste as a result of recycling programs, pollution reduction measures and perhaps because of
the economic downturn and outsourcing of waste-intensive industries to non-OECD countries.
For all types of waste, the OECD projects global increases forward to 2030.106
Figure A7, below, illustrates estimates of the millions of tonnes in recent years and the
kilograms of municipal waste per capita. Note that in 2030, this situation will be dramatically
changed with non-OECD countries expected to produce 70 percent of the world’s waste and
the kilogram per capita per year in Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa
(BRIICS) almost doubling to 270 kilograms per capita, still less than half of OECD countries. 
FIGURE A7.  Current Municipal Waste Generation in OECD, BRIICS, and the Rest of the World107
A growing problem in international waste management is the transport of hazardous or
problematic wastes to countries with lenient policies. Illegal shipments of end-of-life materials
and products are estimated to account for approximately 50 percent of trans-boundary waste
movements into and out of the EU area in 2004-2006.108 The high cost of treatment or disposal
in countries with stricter rules results in illegal shipping to countries with lax enforcement.
Looking forward, waste will continue to be a problem, increasingly so in non-OECD countries.
Like air pollution, there is a need to decouple municipal waste generation from economic
growth so that countries can continue to grow but with a smaller impact on the environment.  
105 OECD, 2008, p.243.
106 Ibid, p.238.
107 Source: data at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/257332441322 
108 Ibid.
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A.6. Ozone Layer Depletion 
Ozone naturally occurs in the upper layers of the atmosphere as a result of oxygen reacting
with sunlight. This layer forms a protective barrier around the Earth absorbing about 97-99
percent of potentially harmful ultraviolet rays from the sun.109 The ozone layer is beneficial –
unlike ground-level ozone (as discussed above) – because it prevents eye, skin and genetic
damage. In recent history, the ozone layer has been threatened. According to NASA, “Each
year for the past few decades during the Southern Hemisphere spring, chemical reactions
involving chlorine and bromine cause ozone in the southern polar region to be destroyed. This
depleted region is known as the ‘ozone hole’.”110
FIGURE A8.  Annual Record of Ozone Hole Area Since 1979111
The ozone hole was first reported in 1974 and was linked to the use of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), released mainly from aerosol containers. Although the size of the hole fluctuates
seasonally and annually, the hole in the ozone layer has actually been shrinking since it reached
its largest size (in area) in September 2006.112 See figure A8 above. Factors that affect ozone
layer concentrations are: stratospheric sulphate aerosols (from large volcanic explosions),
stratospheric winds, GHGs (to the degree that they heat the planet and affect the stratospheric
winds), the sunspot cycle and stratospheric chlorine.113
109 http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/ozonelayer.html 
110 http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/ozone.html 
111Source: http://ozonewatch.gsfc.nasa.gov/ 
112 http://ozonewatch.gsfc.nasa.gov/ 
113 For more details on these factors see: http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/ozonelayer.html
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The Montreal Protocol was the international resolution tasked with managing the problem of
ozone depletion.114 The Protocol was highly successful in reducing ozone depleting substances
in part because a readily available and easily substituted alternative for CFCs, the main culprit,
had been developed. Once DuPont, the industry leader and major producer of CFC-containing
substances had this alternative, they cooperated with the Protocol’s objectives. A stringent
worldwide CFC phase-out schedule was signed by over 100 nations representing 95 percent of
the world's current CFC consumption in 1992.115 Efforts of industry, government, and public
interest groups motivated by improvements in scientific understanding, technical capability,
and a willingness to overcome social and economic barriers resulted in phase-outs and
reductions progressing faster than expected.116
A.7. Oceans
The ocean covers approximately 70 percent of the Earth’s surface and provides habitat for
almost 50 percent of all living species.117 Ocean currents are instrumental in regulating the
global climate by transferring heat from the tropics to the polar regions and are home to
abundant marine life, providing livelihoods for people from all corners of the world while
serving as vital arteries for global trade and transport. The Nature Conservancy estimates that
oceans provide more than $20 trillion annually in ecological goods and services, including
food, medicines and protection from storms.118
The ocean absorbs approximately 25 percent of the CO2 emitted from anthropological sources
annually. Since the industrial revolution, it has absorbed about 50 percent of CO2 emitted –
greatly mitigating the impacts of human activity and slowing the climate change these
emissions would have instigated if they had remained in the air.119 But relatively new research
is finding that the introduction of massive amounts of CO2 into the seas is altering water
chemistry and affecting the life cycles of many marine organisms, particularly those at the
lower end of the food chain. The recent increase is 100 times faster than any change in acidity
levels experienced by marine organisms for at least the last 20 million years.120 
114 http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/history.html#goverment 
115 http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/history.html 
116 Philippe G. Le Prestre et al., “The Montreal Regime : A New Model for International Cooperation on Global
Environmental Issues?,” in Protecting the Ozone Layer: Lessons,Mmodels andPprospects, eds. Philippe Le Prestre,
John D. Reid and E. Thomas Morehouse. (1998). See also Edward Parson’s chapter, “The Montreal Protocol: The
First Adaptive Global Environmental Regime,” in same volume.  
117 http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html  
118
www.nature.org/initiatives/marine/features/art21692.html  
119 http://www.ocean-acidification.net/OAdocs/SPM-hirez2b.pdf and http://ocean.nationalgeographic.com/ocean/critical-
issues-ocean-acidification/ 
120 Ibid. 
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Recent changes to historically stable ocean acidity levels (measured in surface pH) could have
devastating global effects.121 Ocean acidification occurs when carbonic acid is produced
during CO2 absorption by seawater. Ocean acidification is a direct result of CO2 emissions, not
climate change.122 The phenomenon is causing seawater to become toxic to shells and
skeletons of numerous marine organisms and affecting the reproduction and physiology of
some marine life. Scientists at the second symposium on the “Ocean in a High CO2 World”
concluded that in a few decades, “the chemistry of the tropical oceans will not sustain coral
reef growth while large parts of the polar oceans will become corrosive to calcareous marine
organisms [e.g., coral].”123
Another issue threatening oceans, in addition to acidification, is the creation of “dead zones.”
“Dead zones” are areas where the bottom water is depleted of oxygen (anoxic) or where
dissolved oxygen levels are very low. One factor contributing to “dead zones” is
phytoplankton. Phytoplankton (algae) blooms produce organic matter at the surface of the
ocean. This organic matter sinks to the bottom and is broken down by bacteria, which absorb
oxygen and give off carbon dioxide in the process (bacteria respiration).124 Like so many
processes on earth, a phytoplankton bloom is a natural biological cycle that has been
accelerated by human activity as a result of an increase in nutrients such as phosphorous and
nitrogen from agricultural fertilizers and sewage.125 Enhanced phytoplankton activity increases
organic matter production, which increases bacteria respiration and depletes oxygen.
Additionally, overfishing of species near the top of the phytoplankton food chain interferes
with their natural production levels. These blooms have recently mushroomed at an alarming
rate126 causing the dead zones to spread over larger areas of the sea floor.  
Another factor contributing to “dead zones” is the restriction of natural water flow. This
prevents the water with normal dissolved oxygen concentrations from mixing with anoxic
water and refreshing the oxygen supply.127 Mouths of major river systems are areas where
increasing bottom water anoxia has recently been observed. The Mississippi River delta and
the Pearl River mouth in China both experience high levels of sediment and have been affected
by large flooding, causing a heavy load of nutrients (dead animals, animal waste and fertilizer)
to be washed into the sea, resulting in lower oxygen levels. Islands and narrow channels
restrict the Baltic Sea’s water flow; this augments the level of nutrients facilitating
phytoplankton blooms and results in bottom water anoxia.128
121 http://ocean.nationalgeographic.com/ocean/critical-issues-ocean-acidification/  
122 http://www.ocean-acidification.net/OAdocs/SPM-hirez2b.pdf
123 Ibid.
124 http://disc.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/oceancolor/additional/science-focus/ocean-color/science_focus.shtml/dead_zones.shtml 
125 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/02/100305-baltic-sea-algae-dead-zones-water/ 
126 Ibid.
127 http://disc.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/oceancolor/additional/science-focus/ocean-color/science_focus.shtml/dead_zones.shtml
128 Ibid. and http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/02/100305-baltic-sea-algae-dead-zones-water/
33
FIGURE A9.  CO2 and pH Time Series in North Pacific Ocean
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A.8. Fisheries
Global overfishing is the quintessential example of the tragedy of the global commons. The
FAO estimates that over 70 percent of fish species are either fully exploited or depleted.
Fishermen have caught close to 90 percent of all large predatory fish. The causes of gross
unsustainability in fisheries include the presence of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing, excess capacity, inappropriate subsidies, poor domestic governance at the national level
and poor management. The Law of the Sea Convention does not deliver effective management.
We have not had the necessary political leadership needed to carry internationally agreed
targets and declarations into effect. Key states do not participate in existing multilateral
instruments and there is inadequate implementation at the regional level. Subsidies have
created excess fishing capacity, estimated at 250 percent more than is needed to catch the
oceans' sustainable production.130
The international community’s efforts to address the problems of international fisheries
governance include a range of hard and soft law instruments. These take the form of legally
binding global treaties like the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks131 (UNFSA), non-
binding declarations (the Declaration of Cancun, the Reykjavik Declaration, the Rome
Ministerial Declaration to name a few) and resolutions by the FAO Conference and the United
Nations General Assembly. The most comprehensive non-binding instrument that has been
adopted is the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF). The end result is a
patchwork quilt of measures in the form of binding and non-binding instruments with differing
geographical and legal reach and different levels of participation by States.
129 Source:  Doney, S. C., V. J. Fabry, R. A. Feely, and J. Kleypas. 2009. Ocean Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem.
Annual Review of Marine Sciences 1 :169-192. from http://www.nrdc.org/oceans/acidification/figures.asp 
130 http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?l=en&ArticleID=5688&DocumentID=519
See also http://www.unep.ch/etu/etp/acts/manpols/fishery.pdf 
131 Argentina, China, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey are not parties to the UNFSA.
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The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the FAO’s International Plan of Action and
Compliance Agreement, the High Seas Task Force132 and a patchwork of Regional Fishery
Bodies are all ineffective. 
Recent initiatives include the 2009 treaty on port measures to prevent IUU fishing and UNEP’s
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities.133 A useful initiative is the Busan agreement for an Intergovernmental Science
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), an independent platform
mirroring the IPCC.134 Further action is required. 
A.9. Population Growth 
The most serious challenge to environmental sustainability is population growth. Consider the
biological capacity available per person for the more than 6 billion people on earth. “There
were 13.4 billion hectares of biologically productive land and water on this planet in 2005.
Dividing by the 6.5 billion people alive in that year, gives 2.1 global hectares per person. This
assumes that no land is set aside for other species that consume the same biological material
as humans.”135 In North America, we are consuming at four times that rate – it takes about
8 hectares per capita to support our lifestyle. The forecast increase in world population136 is not
consistent with a world consuming at North American levels and the future prospects for many
appear to be life that is nasty and brutish, if not short.
FIGURE A10.  World Population 1950-2050137
132 Fisheries ministers from Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand and the UK, together with the Earth
Institute, IUCN-World Conservation Union, WWF International and the Marine Stewardship Council joined together
in 2003 to launch the Task Force combat IUU fishing on the high seas. The goal of the Task Force is to set priorities
among a series of practical proposals for confronting the challenge of IUU fishing on the high seas. 
133 The United Nations Environment Programme’s  intergovernmental programme addressing the links between
freshwater and coastal environments adopted by 108 governments. http://www.supergreenme.com/go-green-
environment-eco:Overfishing
134 http://www.ipbes.net/home/64-the-g8-supports-the-establishment-of-an-
ipbes.html?139181e9463c94a418d97a0a0634b1b9=7d15ade24789c5f1a1fe11049113885f
135 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/glossary/  
136 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopgraph.html 
137 Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, December 2008 Update. See Hans Rosling’s
www.gapminder.org for animated graphs on global population and population change. 
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Another way to look at population growth is to consider annual changes in world population.
The annual increase in world population peaked at about 88 million in the late 1980s. The peak
occurred then, even though annual growth rates began decreasing in the late 1960s, because the
world population was higher in the 1980s than in the 1960s. The consequence is that for the
next several decades, we face an inexorable increase in world population and the
accompanying challenge to the earth’s carrying capacity.
To a large extent, the slowdown in the growth of population is due to China’s one-child policy.
India138 and Bangladesh have also made strides. Bangladesh is improving; its total fertility
rates fell from 3.17 in 2003 to 2.65 in 2010.139 Given that the replacement rate is 2.0, there is a
still a way to go.
FIGURE A11.  Annual World Population Change 1950-2050140
138
“Wait two years before getting pregnant and the Indian government will pay for a ‘honeymoon package,’ 5,000
rupees, or about $106, if the couple waited to have children. ‘An educated girl is your best contraception aid,” said
Dr. Amarjit Singh, executive director of the National Population Stabilization Fund, a quasi-governmental advisory
agency.” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/world/asia/22india.html?_r=1
139 http://www.indexmundi.com/bangladesh/total_fertility_rate.html 
140 Source: US Census Bureau. Ibid
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S. M. Jordaan & M. C. Moore | December 2010
CANADA, THE G8, AND THE G20: A CANADIAN APPROACH TO SHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
IN A SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/SMITH_finalfinal.pdf
Gordon S. Smith & Peter C. Heap | November 2010
DIFFERENTIATING CANADA: THE FUTURE OF THE CANADA-US RELATIONSHIP
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/dobsonkuzmanovic%20online.pdf
Wendy Dobson & Diana Kuzmanovic | November 2010
EXPANDING CANADA PENSION PLAN RETIREMENT BENEFITS: ASSESSING BIG CPP PROPOSALS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Kesselman%20CPP%20online.pdf
Jonathan R. Kesselman | October 2010 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA AT A CROSSROADS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Lortie%20online.pdf 
Pierre Lortie | October 2010  
CANADA’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CHALLENGE: REDUCING BARRIERS AND ENSURING A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD IN FACE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/mattkrzepkowski%20online2.pdf 
Matt Krzepkowski & Jack Mintz | October 2010
INCREASING THE AFFORDABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY-SIDE MEASURES 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/research_steeletomlinson_onlinefin2.pdf 
Marion Steele & Peter Tomlinson | September 2010
SHOULD GOVERNMENT FACILITATE VOLUNTARY PENSION PLANS?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/researchnielson.pdf
Norma L. Nielson | July 2010
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
Vision
The School of Public Policy will become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical,
global and focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and
environmental policy, international policy and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada. 
Mission
The School of Public Policy has as its mission to strengthen Canada's public service, institutions and
economic performance for the betterment of our families, communities and country. We do this by:
• Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-
degree programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on
expertise to represent our vital interests both here and abroad;
• Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment
programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of
the public sector and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will
shape their futures;
• Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations,
education, and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian
public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the
short term.
The School of Public Policy
The University of Calgary
Earth Sciences Suite 926
2500 University Drive NW
Calgary, Alberta  T2N 1N4
Tel.: 403.210.6112 
Fax: 403.210.6939 
